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Abstract
We have developed a model for securing data-ﬂow based application chains. We have imple-
mented the model in the form of an add-on package for the scientiﬁc workﬂow system called
Kepler. Our Security Analysis Package (SAP) leverages Kepler’s Provenance Recorder (PR).
SAP secures data ﬂows from external input-based attacks, from access to unauthorized exter-
nal sites, and from data integrity issues. It is not a surprise that cost of real-time security is
a certain amount of run-time overhead. About half of the overhead appears to come from the
use of the Kepler PR and the other half from security function added by SAP.
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1 Introduction
Scientiﬁc workﬂow management systems (SWFMS) are in regular use in scientiﬁc commu-
nity. They integrate convenient and powerful components such as graphical user interfaces,
distributed IT environments, and automated execution of application and function chains.
SWFMS can utilize shared cloud and high performance computing environments in a cost
eﬀective way, but if the environment is shared, some concerns may arise.
For example, security can be a major concern when running in a cloud. However, it would
appear that security of cloud-based workﬂows has received a relatively limited attention. On the
other hand, many SWFMS have provenance management tools that monitor the workﬂow and
its intermediate results. It is possible to leverage that functionality to implement an approach
to securing workﬂows [1, 2]. The workﬂow security model we developed does that.
Kepler embraces provenance [3]. We leverage its Provenance Recorder (PR) to capture
workﬂow execution history and through that implement pro-active data-ﬂow security. We have
implemented a prototype of what we call Secure Kepler [2] where we modiﬁed Kepler prove-
nance module and added to it our Security Analysis Package (SAP) that analyzes provenance
information in the security context.
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Figure 1: Workﬂows with SAP
SAP solution was discussed in detail in [2]. In this paper we discuss the overhead that solu-
tion may carry. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information.
Sections 3 and 4 discuss overhead of securing Kepler, and Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Background
On its own, out-of-the-box Kepler does not have any security modules and it relies on security
features of the system where Kepler is executing. We have implemented a prototype of secure
Kepler with Security Analysis Package (SAP). SAP is intended to secure input/output ﬂows at
the level of the control plane [2]. SAP uses Kepler’s provenance module to collect data.
There are three data-ﬂow oriented security property of interest in our model. Input val-
idation is used to detect invalid or unauthorized inputs before they are processed by the
application (or actor). Some of the most frequent security errors are related to lack of input
validation [4]. Remote access validation protects Kepler from accessing malicious remote
resources. Kepler applications may access external resources and some of those may be compro-
mised. For example, accessing invalid URLs or broken links may lead to invalidated redirects
and may invite external attacks [5]. Data integrity tests ensure that internal data ﬂows are
protected from accessing data stores that may have undergone unintentional of unauthorized
changes (e.g., ﬁles). When input data and input ﬁles are used in read-only, they should be the
same as when originally recorded.
In this model, we assume that it is possible to secure the Kepler engine itself (application,
its actors, its directors and its database) as well as its provenance module and the information
the module collects. However, we allow that an adversary may have access to remote resources
that Kepler may use to execute a workﬂow. In other words, we assume that the top two
layers shown in Figure 1 are running in a secure space, and that corruption or attacks if any
emanate from the lowest level - external resources. We therefore protect workﬂow points where
data/information ﬂows into a workﬂow either from some external source, or from an internal
data store (e.g., ﬁle). We trust the actors that receive inputs only from internal data ﬂows. In
complex real-life workﬂows there may be thousands of actors [6] but only relatively few may
be accessing external information and data stores. In that case, while per I/O active actor
security analysis overhead may be substantial, the average over the whole workﬂow may be
roughly proportional to the cost of provenance data collections.
SAP “knows” what security properties, if any, should be veriﬁed for an actor based on
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information to the security veriﬁcation table and generates post-hash value. SAP compares
on-hash from the database with post-hash where the overhead is hash computation to generate
both on-hash and post-hash, rather than comparing two hashes (O(1)). If SAP detects a
security vulnerability during a workﬂow execution, SAP can make a workﬂow execution stop as
a way of fault-tolerance that protects Kepler system. With reference to Figure 2 the overhead
(O) of SAP can be deﬁned as:
O =
j∑
i=1
Ii +
k∑
i=1
Ri +
l∑
i=1
Di + δ (1)
where (1) I, R, and D is the overhead that occurs when we check on the security properties for
input validation, remote access validation, and data integrity, respectively; (2) j, k, and l are the
number of actors that require checking of their security properties instead of assuming them.
Typically those would be actors that communicate with exterior or with internal or external
data stores; and (3) δ is the database access time.
The overhead of input and remote access validation may be smaller than that of checking
data integrity because generating hash values may be a costly operation. In addition, SAP
needs to generate two hash values (i.e., on-hash and post-hash) to compare before and after
values. Of interest is, for example, (a) how much overhead can one expect when SAP is used,
and (b) how is this overhead distributed, i.e., how much is the cost of a typical integrity check,
a typical input validation, and a typical remote access check.
4 An Evaluation
For explanation purposes we use a very simple workﬂow illustrated in Figure 3. The workﬂow
has one or more FileReader actors, and a Display actor. The changing element is the amount
of data read. We use FileReader actor for our micro-benchmark because FileReader has two
security properties to be veriﬁed - input validation and data integrity. First we check if the ﬁle
has not been corrupted, then we check the inputs to make sure the data read from the ﬁle does
not cause problems for the receiving applications, e.g., unexpected escape characters. If the
ﬁle is external to the control plane environment, its integrity would need to be checked every
time (even if it is intended to be a read-only ﬁle). The same is true of its input impact on the
workﬂow. Kepler application provides the execution time (i.e., execution finished) shown
in the bottom of the window in Figure 3. We compute and average execution time by running
each workﬂow a number of times.
4.1 Experimental Platform
Experiments were conducted in a single desktop computer. Processor is Intel Core Quad CPU
2.40Ghz and RAM is 8GB. We used Kepler 2.4 running on Windows 7 Enterprise (64-bit
Operating system) for evaluating the performance overhead of SAP. Figure 3 is the screenshots
of a workﬂow that measures performance overhead. Figure 3a has a FileReader actor which
is assigned diﬀerent ﬁle sizes from 2MB to 10MB. Figure 3b has ﬁve FileReader actors, where
FileReader actors are added one at a time from 1 (one) until 5 (ﬁve). The ﬁles are generated by
a simple program of Dummy File Creator 1. It is worth noting that workﬂow engine and control
plane would typically run in a similar environment (but perhaps on a diﬀerent platform - e.g.,
1http://www.mynikko.com/dummy/
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(a) Diﬀerent ﬁle sizes in a FileReader actor (b) Five FileReader actors
Figure 3: A workﬂow to measure run-time overhead of SAP
Linux), remote elements of the workﬂow may be running on clusters, clouds, supercomputers,
etc.
4.2 Results
Figure 4 shows average workﬂow run-time in milliseconds (vertical axis). X-axis in Figure 4a
indicates ﬁle sizes which the FileReader actor should read and X-axis in Figure 4b indicates
the number of FileReader actors in a workﬂow, each of which reads a ﬁle 2MB in size. For
example, “3x2MB” in Figure 4b denotes that a workﬂow has three FileReader actors, each of
which reads a ﬁle with 2MB in size. Y-axis is the execution time (Time unit: millisecond). We
note that PR includes PR code execution time and database access time which we call “baseline
operating cost”. We looked closer at two security properties (i.e., input and data integrity) being
checked. We did not consider remote access validation because the implementation of remote
access validation is the same as input validation. We conducted the testing with ﬁve cases: (1)
Input validation (INPUT); (2) Data integrity and Input validation (DATA+INPUT); (3) only SAP
(Only SAP); (4) NO SAP - without SAP; and (5) NO Provenance - without PR.
0 
1000 
2000 
3000 
4000 
5000 
6000 
7000 
2MB 4MB 6MB 8MB 10MB 
DATA+INPUT INPUT Only SAP 
NO SAP NO Provenance 
(a) Diﬀerent ﬁle sizes
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
4000 
4500 
1x2MB 2x2MB 3x2MB 4x2MB 5x2MB 
DATA+INPUT INPUT Only SAP 
NO SAP NO Provenance 
(b) Diﬀerent number of FileReader actors
Figure 4: Run-time overhead: Input validation and Data Integrity
In Figure 4, we observe that three cases (i.e., DATA+INPUT, INPUT, and Only SAP) are al-
most the same. Besides visual inspection of the data, we did a quick statistical check to assess
how “close” the curves were. There is almost no diﬀerence among DATA+INPUT checks, INPUT
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checks and Only SAP. We found that core codes for input validation and data integrity checks
have very low overhead compared to I/O related overhead. This is a good news in that mal-
formed inputs are often primary sources of security failures [4], Of course, I/O is always more
expensive than in-memory operations so it is not surprising that ﬁle reading incurs additional
overhead. It is somewhat worrying that with PR turned on, Kepler run is perhaps twice as
expensive (in this example) as it is without PR, and that if input validation is done rigorously
that doubles that overhead. We observe that opening the secure Kepler testing window to show
security results incurs overhead. Also, we observe that performance overhead is not conﬁned
to operation of checking security properties, but is part of SAP operation - which perhaps is
not surprising since SAP draws data from PR even when not acting on any security properties.
We are looking into possibly ameliorating the problem. We will be examining more elaborate
workﬂows or real-world workﬂows to better understand this experimental result.
5 Conclusion
We have examined the level of run-time overhead incurred by our implementation of a security
model for Kepler. There are two sources of direct overhead - one is use of the Kepler provenance
recorder, the other one is run-time processes that our implementation SAP need. These two
costs are about the same. Interestingly, security checks themselves can be a relatively low cost
activity. We continue to work on better understanding of the observed run-time overhead, and
on ﬁnding a less “expensive” solution as well as experimenting on very large workﬂows to assess
scalability properties of SAP model.
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